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Abstract  
This case review examines the Opinion by the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) published on 26 July 2017 on the legal basis of an international agreement signed 
between the EU and Canada providing for the transfer of information on passengers taking 
flights from the EU to Canada and the compatibility of that Agreement with the EU 
fundamental rights, particularly the rights to respect for private life and to protect personal 
data. Rather spectacularly, the CJEU struck down the Agreement, finding the legal basis 
inadequate and the terms incompatible with the EU privacy and data protection guarantees. 
This case review starts by providing a backdrop for the conclusion of the PNR Agreement 
concerned and for the CJEU’s Opinion on that Agreement. Then it moves on to analysing the 
procedural and substantive aspects of the Opinion and finishes with an analysis of the 
consequences regarding  counter-terrorism measures and for the future of the exchange of 
personal data in the field of fight against terrorism and serious transnational crime. It is 
argued here that although Opinion 1/15 deviated from the standard of judicial review 
established by the CJEU in Digital Rights Ireland, Schrems, and Tele2, it should be 
considered as a step towards protecting the EU fundamental rights due to the tight procedural 
conditions for the legality of data sharing agreements it introduced and the high risk of 
litigation following it. 
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I  Introduction 
Since the attacks in the USA on 11 September 2001, states’ interest in information on 
individuals crossing the borders has grown exponentially. This interest has amplified 
concerns regarding the legitimacy of the interference with the private lives of individuals, yet 
more often than not, states have invoked national security as a justification permitting them to 
take measures of questionable compatibility with the right to privacy as part of their border 
controls. Using Passenger Name Records (PNR) data, which is an umbrella term to cover a 
wide array of information about air passengers far beyond the mere identity including but not 
limited to reservations and travel information, has been at the forefront of these concerns. The 
quest for the PNR data started in the USA and then spread to other states, within and outside 
the EU.1 The agreement negotiated between the EU and Canada on the transfer and use of 
those data was a result of this spread. Its challenge before the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) has unravelled a range of issues. The key issues are the CJEU’s 
emphasis on the law enforcement aspect of counter-terrorism action, a possible carve out the 
concept of “terrorism” from the general field of national security and its place near EU police 
co-operation. Secondly, in the Opinion that is the subject of this article, the CJEU set out a 
list of procedural requirements which any agreement covering the transfer of personal data to 
a non-EU Member State for the purpose of the fight against terrorism and serious 
transnational crime must meet in order to comply with the EU fundamental rights of privacy 
and personal data protection.  
                                                          
1 The United Kingdom, Sweden, and Belgium are the EU Member States with a fully functioning national PNR 
scheme. European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
use of Passenger Name Record data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist 
offences and serious crime’ COM(2011) 32 final. 
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This case review examines the CJEU’s Opinion on the conclusion of the Canada PNR 
Agreement.2 In this context, it provides a background to the Opinion, followed by its 
summary and commentary. 
II  Background to the Opinion 
As a response to and in solidarity with the USA following the attacks in New York 
and Washington D.C. on 11 September 2001, Canada enacted a law that obliged air carriers 
to transfer the information on Canada-bound air travel passengers to the Canadian border 
control authority, Canada Border Service Agency (CBSA).3 This information is called the 
Passenger Name Record (PNR) and it is generated by passengers, their travel agencies, and 
their air carriers when those passengers book, check-in, and board a flight.4 PNR includes a 
wide array of information ranging from passengers’ names, their addresses, the means of 
payment for the flight, or any travel-related preferences made by passengers as in-flight meal 
choices or wheel-chair requests.5 
The Canadian law obliging the transfer of the PNR data was potentially at odds with 
the EU rules on data transfers to third countries, which are permitted only insofar as that third 
country has an adequate level of protection for personal data as guaranteed in the EU.6 The 
European Commission was conferred the power to determine whether the third country 
                                                          
2 Opinion 1/15 of the Court (Grand Chamber) ECLI:EU:C:2017:592 [2017]. 
3 See, the Anti-Terrorism Act 2001. For information on the issue see; Peter Hobbing, ‘Tracing Terrorists: The 
EU-Canada Agreement in PNR Matters’, (CEPS, September 2008) <http://aei.pitt.edu/11745/1/1704.pdf> 
(accessed 29 November 2017). 
4 International Civil Aviation Organization, ‘Guidelines on Passenger Name Record (PNR) Data’ (2010) 
available at <https://www.iata.org/iata/passenger-data-toolkit/assets/doc_library/04-
pnr/New%20Doc%209944%201st%20Edition%20PNR.pdf> (accessed 29 November 2017). 
5 ibid. 
6 Art. 25 of the Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, 
OJ L 281, 23 November 1995 [hereinafter, ‘Data Protection Directive’]. 
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guaranteed the required level of protection.7 However, the European Commission had not 
exercised it for Canada. Therefore, without an adequacy finding by the European 
Commission, the air carriers were in breach of EU law if they transferred the PNR data to 
Canada. They were also in breach of the Canadian law requiring them to disclose the PNR 
data to the CBSA. 
To settle the dispute, the European Commission and the CBSA started to negotiate an 
agreement with the aim of ensuring that PNR data could be transferred to the CBSA, whilst 
the fundamental rights of the individuals were protected in accordance with the EU standards. 
The results of these negotiations were a time limited adequacy decision8 adopted on 6 
September 2006 by the European Commission in accordance with the powers conferred to it 
under the Data Protection Directive 95/469 (will be replaced by the General Data Protection 
Regulation in May 201810), and the international agreement, which entered into force in 
March 2006.11 
This Agreement allowed for the transfer of PNR data of all passengers flying from the 
EU to Canada, the subsequent retention and use of such data for the purpose of countering 
terrorism and serious transnational crime.12 Once the PNR data were acquired by the CBSA, 
                                                          
7 Article 25 (5) and (6) of the Data Protection Directive (n 6). 
8 Commission Decision 2006/253/EC of 6 September 2005 on the adequate protection of personal data 
contained in the Passenger Name Record of air passengers transferred to the Canada Border Services Agency 
[2006] OJ L91/49 [hereinafter, ‘Decision 2006/253’]. 
9 Data Protection Directive (n 6). 
10 Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of 
natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and 
repealing Directive 95/46/EC [2016] OJ L 119/1. 
11 Council Decision 2006/230/EC of 18 July 2005 on the conclusion of an Agreement between the European 
Community and the Government of Canada on the processing of API/PNR data [2006] OJ L82/14; Agreement 
between the European Community and the Government of Canada on the processing of Advance Passenger 
Information and Passenger Name Record data [2006] OJ L 82/15 [hereinafter, ‘2006 Canada PNR Agreement’]. 
12 Arts 1, 3, and 5 of the 2006 Canada PNR Agreement (n 11). 
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they were processed to identify passengers who posed a risk to public security, but who were 
not known by the CBSA.13  
The adequacy decision, and consequently the 2006 Agreement, expired in 200914, but 
the CBSA agreed to abide by the data protection commitments underpinning the adequacy 
decision until the conclusion of a new agreement.15 The negotiations for a new agreement 
started following a European Commission’s Communication of 21 September 201016 and the 
European Parliament’s resolution of 11 November 2010.17 After four years of negotiations, 
the new agreement between the EU and Canada on the transfer of PNR data was signed on 25 
June 2014.18 In order for this Agreement to be effective for the EU, the European Parliament 
had to approve it. However, the changed political landscape on international personal data 
transfer after the revelations of mass surveillance by USA intelligence authorities made by 
Edward Snowden in 2013 was nowhere more evident than in the European Parliament.19 
Therefore, instead of approving it, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on 25 
November 2014 seeking an opinion from the Court of Justice of the European Union on 
                                                          
13 Hobbing (n 3) 15-17. 
14 Art. 7 of the Decision 2006/253 (n 8) (“This Decision shall expire three years and six months after the date of 
its notification, unless extended in accordance with the procedure set out in Article 31(2) of Directive [95/46], 
Agreement 5(1) and 2.”) 
15 Arianna Vedaschi and Gabriele Marino Noberasco, ‘From DRD to PNR: Looking for a New Balance 
Between Privacy and Security’ 67-90, in: David Cole, Federico Fabbrini, and Stephen Schulhofer (eds), 
Surveillance, Privacy and Trans-Atlantic Relations, (Hart Publishing, 2017). 
16 European Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission of 21 September 2010 on the global approach 
to transfers of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data to third countries’, COM(2010) 492. 
17 European Parliament Resolution of 11 November 2010 on the global approach to transfers of passenger name 
record (PNR) data to third countries, P7_TA(2010)0397. 
18 For the difference between the agreements signed with Canada in 2006 and in 2014 see; Vedaschi and 
Noberasco (n 15). 
19 For the European Parliament’s response to those revelations see; European Parliament’ ‘Report on the US 
NSA surveillance programme, surveillance bodies in various Member States and their impact on EU citizens’ 
fundamental right and on transatlantic cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs’, P7_TA(2014)0230, (21 
February 2014). 
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whether the draft Agreement was compatible with EU fundamental rights and whether it had 
been concluded on an appropriate legal basis.20  
III  The Opinion of the CJEU 
The transfer of personal data outside the EU has been in the spotlight since the 
CJEU’s Schrems decision, which struck down in 2015 the European Commission’s adequacy 
finding on the basis of which the Safe Harbour principles for the personal data transfers from 
the EU to US businesses had been considered as compliant with the EU standards.21 On 26 
July 2017, the CJEU added another brick to the privacy wall concerning the personal data 
transfers to a non-EU Member State country in its Opinion on the draft agreement between 
the EU and Canada on the transfer of PNR data, their subsequent access and use for the 
purpose for countering terrorism and serious transnational crimes. This section reviews this 
Opinion and consists of two sub-section (a) the procedural part and (b) substantive part of the 
Opinion.  
A  The Procedural Part of the Judgment: The Question on the Appropriate Legal Basis 
In its lengthy and rather technical assessment of the appropriate legal basis for the 
conclusion of the Canada PNR Agreement, the CJEU dealt with issues that may have far-
reaching impacts in the field of EU counter-terrorism, and on the legality of the existing PNR 
agreements with other countries. The CJEU put emphasis on the relation between the transfer 
and use of information in the context of combatting terrorism and serious transnational crime 
and police co-operation in criminal matters when determining the correct legal basis for the 
                                                          
20 European Parliament, ‘MEPs refer EU-Canada air passenger data to the EU Court of Justice’, (25 November 
2014) Press Release available at <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-
room/20141121IPR79818/meps-refer-eu-canada-air-passenger-data-deal-to-the-eu-court-of-justice> (accessed 
29 November 2017). 
21 C-362/14 Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner ECLI:EU:C:2015:650 [2015]. For 
commentary see; Tuomas Ojanen, ‘Making the Essence of Fundamental Rights Real: The Court of Justice of the 
European Union Clarifies the Structure of Fundamental Rights under the Charter’, (2016) 12(2) European 
Constitutional Law Review 318. 
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Canada PNR Agreement. To make this matter comprehensible, a brief account of the EU 
counter-terrorism framework is given below.22 However, it is worth noting here that this 
emphasis can be considered as the CJEU’s willingness to highlight that counter-terrorism 
action is about not only the security and defence dialogue, but also police co-operation in 
relation to the prevention, detection, and investigation of criminal offences. Seen from this 
angle, the CJEU might be ready to consider that insofar as surveillance measures in the field 
of national security relate to the fight against terrorism and serious transnational crime, 
authorities must ensure that those measures respect the EU rules on privacy and protection of 
personal data. 
At the outset, the CJEU identified two objectives for the Canada PNR Agreement: 
ensuring public security by preventing, combatting, repressing, and eliminating terrorism and 
serious transnational crime, and respecting the fundamental rights of the right to respect for 
private life and to the protection of personal data.23 It further observed that the transfer of 
PNR data to Canadian competent authorities and their subsequent use by those authorities 
were justified only by the objective of ensuring public security in Canada and in the EU.24 
Moreover, that transfer can only be permissible if the receiving third country such as Canada 
ensured a level of fundamental rights protection that is essentially equivalent that of afforded 
in the EU.25 Based on these observations, the Court held that both objectives that the 
Agreement pursued were inextricably linked with each other.26 This means that measures 
relating to the use of personal data for purposes of fighting terrorism and serious transnational 
crime have to abide by EU fundamental rights of privacy and protection of personal data 
obligations. 
                                                          
22 See section (IV). 
23 Opinion 1/15 (n 2), paras 80-90. 
24 ibid., para. 91. 
25 ibid., para. 93. 
26 ibid., para. 94. 
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In relation to the objective of respecting fundamental rights (a) to respect for private 
life and (b) to the protection of personal data, it is no surprise that the CJEU found Article 16 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) as one of the appropriate 
legal base to conclude the Canada PNR Agreement because that Article covers the right to 
protection of personal data.27 The point in placing counter-terrorism within the sphere of 
police co-operation emerged when the Court held that Article 87(2)(a) of TFEU (police co-
operation in criminal matters) was the correct legal base to accommodate the Agreement’s 
objective of ensuring public security. The Agreement provided rules on the transfer and use 
of data for purposes of prevention, investigation, and detection of terrorism and serious 
transnational crimes, - a type of information and of data processing that fell within the sphere 
of Article 87(2)(a) of TFEU.28 
Thus, the CJEU held that the correct legal basis were Articles 16 and 87(2)(a) of the 
TFEU, but not Article 82(1)(d) of TFEU on the judicial co-operation in criminal matters 
(which the European Commission had proposed). Therefore, the Canada PNR was based on 
an incorrect legal basis. Evidently, this finding casts doubt on the legal basis of the existing 
data transfer agreements in the field of fight against terrorism and serious transnational crime 
that refer to the latter article such as agreements signed with the USA29 and Australia30 on the 
transfer of PNR data.31 
                                                          
27 Opinion 1/15 (n 2), para. 97.  
28 ibid., para. 100. 
29 Agreement between the United States of America and the European Union on the use and transfer of 
passenger name record to the United States of Department of Homeland Security [2012] OJ L 215/5. 
30 Agreement between the European Union and Australia on the use and transfer of Passenger Name Record 
(PNR) data by air carriers to the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service [2012] OJ L 186/4. 
31 In his opinion on the Canada PNR Agreement, the Advocate General Mengozzi mentioned this issue and 
noted that the finding relating to Article 82(1)(d) of the TFEU as the incorrect legal basis for concluding the 
relevant agreement did not mean that PNR data agreement with the USA and Australia that based on the same 
article were void. He added that ‘the legal basis used for the adoption of other Union measures that might 
9 
 
B  The Substantive Part of the Judgment: Determining the Compatibility of the EU-
Canada PNR Agreement with EU Fundamental Rights 
The first time the CJEU was asked about the compatibility of the PNR transfer 
scheme with privacy and personal data protection rights was in 2006, when the European 
Parliament challenged the then valid PNR data transfer agreement with the USA.32  The 
European Parliament argued that the legal basis for that Agreement was incorrect and that it 
was in breach of fundamental rights.33 At the time of the challenge, the Lisbon Treaty had yet 
to be negotiated, and thus there was no Article 16 of the TFEU or its equivalent. As a result, 
the Court only addressed the legal basis question, without going further into the complaint in 
relation to a possible fundamental rights violation.34 
By 2017, the compliance of the PNR data transfer scheme with fundamental rights 
post-Lisbon was central for the CJEU in its Opinion 1/15. In the Court’s view, the Canada 
PNR Agreement could not be concluded in its current form because it was incompatible with 
the EU rights to respect for private life and to protection of personal data. It further provided 
a list of procedural requirements which any data transfer for the purpose of the fight against 
terrorism and serious transnational crime must satisfy. The reasoning for these requirements 
is of great importance for the current and prospective data transfers in the context of fight 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
display similar characteristics is irrelevant.’ Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi in Opinion 1/15 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:656 [2016], para. 109. 
32 Agreement between the European Community and the United States of America on the processing and 
transfer of PNR data by air carriers to the United States Department of Homeland Security, Bureau of Customs 
and Border Protection [2004] OJ L 142 M. 
33 Joined Cases Case C-317/07 and C-318/04, European Parliament v. Council of the European Union (C-
317/04) and European Parliament v. Commission of the European Communities (C-318/04), 2006 E.C.R I-
4721. 
34 It is sufficient to note here that the CJEU could address the complaint on the breach of fundamental rights by 
referring to Article 8 of the European Court of Human Rights in light of Article 6 (1) of the Treaty on European 
Union (TEU). See; Cian Murphy, The EU Counter-Terrorism Law: Pre-Emption and the Rule of Law (Hart 
Publishing, 2015) 165-166; Elspeth Guild and Evelien Brouwer, ‘The Political Life of Data: The ECJ Decision 
on the PNR Agreement between the EU and the US’, (CEPS No. 109 July 2006) 4-5. 
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against terrorism and serious transnational crime in general, and the future negotiations for all 
PNR agreements in particular. 
 First, the CJEU turned its attention to the impact that the use of PNR data has on the 
private lives’ of individuals concerned. According to the Court, the Canada PNR Agreement 
permitted ‘the systematic and continuous transfer of PNR data of all passengers flying 
between the European Union and Canada.’35 Also, such data as a whole may ‘reveal a 
complete travel itinerary, travel habits, relationships existing between air passengers and the 
financial situation of air passengers, their dietary habits or state of health, and may even 
provide sensitive information about those passengers.’36  
The Court further accepted that PNR data were chiefly used as an intelligence tool.37 
Here, it mentioned two techniques for using those data. The first technique was the 
systematic and automatic analysis of the transferred PNR data based on the pre-established 
models and criteria before the flights reach to Canada.38 The second technique was the 
crosschecking of those data with other databases, which in turn could reveal additional 
information on the private lives of the passengers.39 These techniques were used to identify 
passengers who may pose a risk to public security, and thus who may be subjected to 
additional checks at borders.40 Additionally, the Court stressed that the five-year retention 
period for the PNR data required under the Canada PNR Agreement constituted a lengthy 
time for which the information on the private lives of individuals was available.41 
                                                          
35 Opinion 1/15 (n 2), para. 127. [Emphasis added] 
36 ibid., para. 128. [Emphasis added] 
37 ibid., para. 130. 
38 ibid., para. 131. 
39 ibid. 
40 ibid., para. 132. 
41 ibid. 
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Having observed the aggravated interference resulting from the Canada PNR 
Agreement with the right to privacy and protection of personal data, the CJEU proceeded to 
analyse the justification for such interference.  At the outset, it clarified the general rules for 
that justification in light of its settled case-law. Therefore, it referred to Article 8(2) of the 
Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Charter), according to which 
personal data must be processed ‘for specified purposes and on the basis of the consent of the 
person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law’42, and to Article 52(1) of 
the Charter, according to which any limitation on the rights enshrined in it ‘must be provided 
for by law and respect the essence of those rights.’43 The latter article further required that, 
subject to the principle of proportionality, such limitation must be necessary and genuinely 
meet objectives of general interest recognised by the EU.44 Using its decisions on Digital 
Rights Ireland45, Schrems46, and Tele247 as the legal authorities, the CJEU held that the 
proportionality principle required the limitation on the protection of personal data to apply 
only insofar as it was strictly necessary. 48 In order to be meet this strict necessity 
requirement, the contested legislation ‘must lay down clear and precise rules governing the 
scope and application of the measure and imposing minimum safeguards’ against the risk of 
                                                          
42 Opinion 1/15 (n 2), para. 137. 
43 ibid., para. 138. 
44 ibid. 
45 Joined Cases C293/12 and C594/12 Digital Rights Ireland v. The Minister for Communications, Marine and 
Natural Resources and Others ECLI:EU:C:2014:238 [2014]. For commentary see; Marie-Pierre Granger and 
Kristina Irion, ‘The Court of Justice and the Data Retention Directive in Digital Rights Ireland: telling off the 
EU legislator and teaching a lesson in privacy and data protection’ (2014) 39(6) European Law Review 835. 
46 Schrems (n 21). 
47 C-203/15 Tele2 Sverige AB v. Post –och telestyrelsen and Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Tom 
Watson and Others ECLI:EU:C:2016:970 [2016]. For commentary see; Iain Cameron, ‘A Court of Justice 
Balancing data protection and law enforcement needs: Tele2 Sverige and Watson’, (2017) 54(5) Common 
Market Law Review 1467. 
48 Opinion 1/15 (n 2), para. 140. 
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abuse, and must elaborate ‘in what circumstances and under which conditions a measure 
providing for the processing of such data may be adopted.’49 
Having considered the general principles on the limitation on the rights to respect for 
private life and to protection of personal data, the CJEU went on to consider the details of the 
Canada PNR Agreement. When determining the legal basis upon which the PNR data were 
processed, the Court rejected the argument that the passengers’ consent qualified as a basis as 
such because that consent was given in relation to the collection of their data for reservation 
purposes and not for the transfer of those data to Canada.50 The Agreement did not provide 
for the PNR data transfer on the condition of passengers’ consent, and therefore that transfer 
had to be based on some other legal basis within the meaning of Article 8(2) of the Charter.51 
According to the Court, the Canada PNR Agreement constituted that basis.52 It is worth 
noting here that even if the Agreement had required such consent requirement, the CJEU 
might have made the same conclusion because the validity of the consent obtained by air 
carrier companies in the online environment would have come under scrutiny. The crux of 
the validity question is that individuals are not able to reserve flights unless certain 
information is disclosed and used for purposes other than they have expected. Therefore, their 
consents for the processing of that information (i.e. PNR data) are invalid as they were not 
given freely and fully informed.53 
                                                          
49 Opinion 1/15 (n 2), para. 141. 
50 ibid., paras 142-143. 
51 ibid., para. 144 
52 ibid., para. 147. 
53 Under EU data protection laws, consent must be freely given, informed, and explicit. Article 29 Working 
Party, which is the EU’s data protection authority, dealt with the passengers’ consent during the negotiations for 
the PNR agreement with the USA in 2002 and held that such consent was invalid because passengers had no 
choice of agreeing with the processing of PNR data if they wishes to fly to the USA, and thus their consent was 
not given freely. See; Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 15/2011 on the definition of consent’, 
01197/11/EN WP187, (13 July 2011) available at <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-
29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2011/wp187_en.pdf> (accessed 29 November 2017), 16. 
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The next stage on the compatibility question was the existence of an objective of 
general interest carried out by the Canada PNR Agreement. At this point, the CJEU reiterated 
its earlier statement and noted that the transfer and use of those data under the Agreement 
were carried out in order to ensure public security, which was an objective of general interest 
that is capable of justifying even serious interferences with Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter.54 
Moreover, it accepted that the transfer and use of PNR data under the Agreement were 
appropriate for enhancing public security as those data facilitated security and border control 
checks. 55 In its earlier paragraphs, the Court referred to the information provided by the 
CBSA on the number of arrests made for almost a year. Accordingly, between April 2014 
and March 2015, 28 million air passengers travelled from the EU to Canada and out of those 
passengers 178 arrests were made, 71 drug and 2 child pornography material seizures were 
carried out, and for 169 further investigations in relation to terrorism were made.56  
The acceptance by the CJEU of the appropriateness of the PNR data transfer scheme 
is interesting because the information given above suggests that there is a disproportion 
between the vast number of passengers travelling to Canada and the low number of cases in 
which the PNR data proved of any use in the fight against terrorism and serious transnational 
crime. This is of great importance when determining the proportionality of the interference 
caused by the Canada PNR Agreement, but the CJEU did not consider this issue. Perhaps it is 
keeping its power dry for another case. Another issue is that the appropriateness of the PNR 
data transfer scheme is contestable, despite what the CJEU held in Opinion 1/15. The 
European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS)’s observation on the Canada PNR Agreement 
                                                          
54 Opinion 1/15 (n 2), para. 149. 
55 ibid., paras 152-153. 
56 ibid., para. 54. 
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is instructive in this regard.57 In this context, the EDPS noted that ‘[he] has not seen 
convincing elements showing the necessity and proportionality of the massive and routine 
processing of data of non-suspicious passengers for law enforcement purposes.’58 In tune 
with the EDPS, the Article 29 Working Party observed the absence of objective statistics 
proving the use of PNR data in the fight against terrorism and serious transnational crime 
when addressing the transfer of those to third countries from a data protection point of 
view.59 Interestingly, the CJEU also mentioned in the Opinion at hand that the European 
Commission and the Council did not have precise statistics showing that the use of PNR data 
contributes to the fight against terrorism and serious transnational crime.60 Therefore, it is 
hard to reconcile the CJEU’s final observation on the appropriateness of the PNR data 
transfer scheme.  
Moving on to the next stage on the compatibility question on determining whether the 
interference cause by the contested measure was proportionate to achieve the aim that 
measure pursued, the CJEU laid down the limitations for the transfer and use of PNR data in 
light of the strict necessity test. In this regard, it observed that the categories of PNR data to 
be transferred under the Canada PNR Agreement had to be defined clearly and precisely. The 
Agreement did not meet this requirement because some categories such as ‘available frequent 
flyer and benefit information (free tickets, upgrades, etc.)’, ‘all available contact information 
(including originator information)’ and ‘general remarks including Other Supplementary 
                                                          
57 Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the Proposals for Council Decisions on the conclusion 
and the signature of the Agreement between Canada and the European Union on the transfer and processing of 
Passenger Name Record Data, (EDPS, 30 September 2013) available at 
<https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/13-09-30_canada_en.pdf> (accessed 29 November 2017). 
58 ibid., note 3. 
59 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 7/2010 on European Commission’s Communication on 
the global approach to transfers of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data to third countries’, 622/10/EN WP178 
(12 November 2010), 3 available at <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-
29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2010/wp178_en.pdf> (accessed 29 November 2017). 
60 Opinion 1/15 (n 2), para. 55. 
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Information (OSI), Special Service Information (SSI) and Special Service Request (SSR) 
information’ failed to delineate the scope of transferred data.61 As regards the sensitive data, 
which cover the information relating to ‘racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or 
philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership, or concerning a person’s health or sex life62, 
the CJEU noted that the Canada PNR Agreement did not directly involved the data of this 
nature.63 Nevertheless, the fact remained that the Agreement could provide for the transfer of 
such data because the OSI, SII, and SSR information could include information on 
passengers’ in-flight meal choices (i.e. halal or kosher food) or wheelchair assistance, which 
in turn was capable of revealing information on religious beliefs or person’s health.64 For this 
reason, the CJEU argued that the Agreement carried the risk of infringing the principle of 
non-discrimination as enshrined in Article 21 of the Charter.65 This meant that the transfer of 
sensitive data under the Agreement had to be based on ‘a precise and particularly solid 
justification’, rather than merely referring to the protection of public security against 
terrorism and serious transnational crime.66 The Agreement lacked such justification, and 
thus the transfer of sensitive data to Canada, their use and retention by the Canadian 
authorities under it were incompatible with the Charter.67 
At the next stage of the proportionality assessment, the CJEU noted some points on 
the pre-established models upon which such processing is made, the results achieved by those 
                                                          
61 Opinion 1/15 (n 2), paras 156-163. 
62 Art. 8 of the Canada PNR Agreement. 
63 Opinion 1/15 (n 2), para. 164 
64 ibid. See also; Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the Proposal for a Council Decision on 
the conclusion of the Agreement between the United States of America and the European Union on the use and 
transfer of Passenger Name Records to the United States of Homeland Security, (EDPS, 9 December 2011) 
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models, and the databases utilised for crosschecking. First of all, it held that the pre-
established models should be specific and reliable.68 Secondly, the results made in light of 
them must identify individuals on the basis of a reasonable suspicion of participation in 
terrorist offences and transnational crimes, and these results must be compatible with the 
principle of non-discrimination.69 Thirdly, the databases utilised for crosschecking the PNR 
data ‘must be reliable, up to date, and limited to databases used by Canada in relation to the 
fight against terrorism and serious transnational crime.’70 Fourthly, given that the data 
analysis made on the basis of the automated processing of PNR data involved some margin of 
error, any positive result must be re-examined by an individual before a measure adversely 
affecting a passenger is made.71 Lastly, in the view of the CJEU, all the mentioned points 
should be included in the joint review of the Canada PNR Agreement.72 
Regarding the purposes for which the PNR data are processed, the CJEU was of the 
opinion that the definitions of terrorist offences and serious transnational crimes were 
sufficiently clear and precise.73 However, the Canada PNR Agreement contained other 
purposes for which the PNR data may be processed. The processing for the protection of the 
vital interests of any individual including a significant public health risk was one of those 
purposes and the Court held that this purpose was defined sufficiently clear, despite the fact 
that it also covered interests other than countering terrorism and serious transnational crime.74 
That said, it further stated that the processing of the PNR data on a case-by-case basis to 
‘ensure the oversight or accountability of the public administration’ and to ‘comply with the 
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subpoena or warrant issues, or an order made, by a court’ was ‘too vague and general to meet 
the requirements as to clarity and precision required.’75 Another issue relating to the scope of 
the rules for processing of PNR data was the identities of the competent Canadian authorities 
for such processing, which the Court found as sufficiently and clearly defined.76 
The CJEU then went on to analyse the extent of the transfer of PNR data of all air 
passengers flying from the EU to Canada. It is important to note here that in its Schrems and 
Tele2 decisions, the CJEU acknowledged that EU law precluded the generalised and 
indiscriminate retention of personal data and access to those data by public authorities.77 In 
this regard, such retention and access must be limited based on a connection between those 
data and the participation of persons concerned with terrorism and serious crimes.78 In 
relation to the transfer of PNR data of all air passengers, the Court accepted that this 
untargeted transfer was EU fundamental rights complaint. The reason for this finding boiled 
down the principal aim of the automated PNR data analysis, which was to identify who are 
unknown to Canadian authorities, and who pose a potential public security risk, and thus may 
be subject to further examination at the border.79 In view of the Court, excluding certain 
passengers or certain areas of origin would be detrimental in achieving this aim.80 For this 
reason, the transfer of PNR data of all passengers, regardless of their criminal background 
was permissible. 
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By contrast, the CJEU did not accept the retention and use of PNR data of all passengers 
once they had been admitted to Canada. It limited the use of those data to the time when the 
passenger concerned is in Canada and to the ‘new circumstances justifying that use.’81 There 
must be substantive and procedural conditions and circumstances based on objective criteria 
under which the Canadian authorities can perform further use of PNR data as such.82 Further, 
a court or an administrative authority must approve the access to those retained data on the 
basis of a reasoned request made by those authorities.83  That reason must be limited to the 
prevention, detection, or prosecution of crime.84 
In relation to the retention and use of PNR data after passengers’ departure from Canada, 
the CJEU noted that the required connection between the personal data and the objective 
pursued did not exist because passengers had already been verified as a non-security risk in 
light of their PNR data upon their arrival to and during their stay in Canada.85 For this reason, 
in principle, the continued retention of PNR data of passengers on their departure from 
Canada was unjustified unless passengers present a risk as regards terrorism and serious 
transnational crime on the basis of objective evidence.86 That further access must be subject 
to substantive and procedural conditions based on objective criteria under which the 
Canadian authorities can have access to those data stored beyond passengers’ stay in 
Canada.87 A court or an independent administrative body must grant such access.88 With 
regards to the length of time for which the PNR data are retained, the CJEU held that the 
five-year retention was justified because the lifespan of investigating serious crime networks 
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could be lengthy and complex.89 Moreover, the continued retention of PNR data after 
passengers concerned have left Canada was justified on the condition that those data were 
kept in Canada and were irreversibly destroyed at the end of the retention period.90  
Regarding the disclosure of the PNR data to government authorities of other third 
countries, the CJEU reiterated its finding in Schrems91 that the data transfers to a third 
country is permissible if that country affords an essentially equivalent data protection to that 
guaranteed in the EU.92 Following this, the CJEU considered that this required level of 
protection applied to PNR data transfers from Canada to third countries.93 From thereon, it 
found that the Canada PNR Agreement did not meet the strict necessity requirements because 
it conferred a discretionary power to the competent Canadian authority to assess the level of 
data protection afforded in third countries even if a positive finding by the EU on that level 
does not exit, which in turn carried the risk of circumventing the ‘essentially equivalent 
protection’ requirement.94 The disclosure of PNR data to the third persons was also not 
strictly necessary because the conditions for such disclosure were defined vaguely.95   
The CJEU further considered passengers’ rights to access their PNR data and to have 
them rectified. It noted that these rights were linked with the rights of those passengers to be 
informed of the transfer and the use of their PNR data once the risk of jeopardising the 
investigation disappears.96 It observed that although the Canada PNR Agreement contained 
provisions on the right to access and correction, it did provide a notification procedure for 
individuals. According to the CJEU, the transparency provision under the Canada PNR 
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Agreement was insufficient in satisfying such procedure for the passengers, because it merely 
referred to the transfer and use of PNR data for the purposes of security checks and border 
controls. In this context, the passengers were not notified of the situations in which the PNR 
data are used for the purposes beyond those checks and controls.97 Furthermore, the CJEU 
was satisfied with the remedies that the Canada PNR Agreement provided for the 
passengers.98 However, it observed that the Agreement failed to provide in a sufficiently 
clear and precise manner that the oversight mechanism carry out its task independently as 
enshrined in Article 8(3) of the Charter.99 
Overall, the procedural requirements that the Court seeks in the Canada PNR 
Agreement in particular and in data transfer schemes for the fight against terrorism and 
serious transnational crime are the following100:  
- The categories of PNR data to be transferred must be defined clearly and 
precisely. 
- The pre-established models through which the PNR data are automatically 
analysed must be specific, reliable, and non-discriminatory.  
- The use of PNR data is limited to the fight against terrorism and serious 
transnational crime.  
- There must be substantive and procedural conditions based on objective criteria 
against which the PNR data can be used and accessed by public authorities after 
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the passenger concerned is admitted to the country. Court or independent 
administrative body must review that use and access a priori. 
- The continued retention of PNR data is permitted only if there is objective 
evidence that the passenger concerned present a risk on the grounds of terrorism 
and serious transnational crime. 
- The PNR data can only be disclosed to a competent authority in a non-EU country 
if it has an agreement with the EU equivalent to the Canada PNR Agreement, or it 
benefits from a positive adequacy finding by the European Commission.  
- It must be ensured that the passengers are notified individually of the use of their 
PNR data. 
- There must be independent oversight mechanisms over the implementation of the 
Canada PNR Agreement.  
IV  Commentary 
The implications of the CJEU’s opinion on the Canada PNR Agreement is wide-
ranging. One certain implication is that the European Commission will have to re-negotiate 
the Agreement in light of the criteria under which the transfer of personal data for the purpose 
of fight against terrorism and serious transnational crime is considered as legal in EU law.101 
The European Parliament’s attitude in the aftermath of Opinion 1/15 is interesting in 
understanding the direction that the discourse surrounding the Canada PNR Agreement could 
go. On the one hand, there were strong voices for privacy protection that called on the 
prevalence of privacy rights in the future renegotiation stage.102 On the other hand, there were 
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those voices emphasising the higher value of security over privacy rights, whilst having 
welcomed the CJEU’s Opinion.103 How these conflicting views will play out in the European 
Parliament remains to be seen. 
Moreover, the CJEU’s findings in relation to the legal basis of the Agreement raises 
questions on the general mandate of EU in relation to counter-terrorism measures. It is worth 
noting here that this mandate is scattered across the EU’s different competencies.104 These 
include police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters and EU’s Common Foreign and 
Security Policy.105 What this scattered legal framework means is that there is a tension 
between law enforcement co-operation and defence dialogue at the EU level.106 As the extent 
of oversight of the counter-terrorism measures would differ depending on the legal 
framework under which they are adopted, it is difficult to ascertain that fundamental rights 
obligations are respected when implementing those measures. This issue brings to the surface 
particularly at the EU-internal level how terrorism is identified as a threat to the EU Member 
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States’ national security, which is firmly lies within their competence.107 As a result, there is 
a strong claim that their actions for the fight against terrorism fall outside the scope of EU 
law and the jurisdiction of the CJEU. Opinion 1/15, however, may be read as the CJEU’s first 
salvo towards this mantra. As a starting point, the Court highlights the link between the 
police co-operation in criminal matters and the protection of public security through fighting 
terrorism and serious transnational crime, which seems to indicate a tilt towards counter-
terrorism measures as part of the police co-operation dimension. The CJEU’s further move of 
linking the objective of personal data protection and police co-operation suggests that the 
Court sees the EU fundamental rights of privacy and personal data protection obligations as 
the constraints on counter-terrorism measures involving the transfer and use of personal data. 
Taking the argument a bit further, perhaps it can be suggested that the CJEU is willing to 
carve out the terrorism threat from the concept of national security interest, and take 
surveillance measures in relation to that interest within the remit of EU police co-operation 
when they are carried out for the purpose of the fight against terrorism.108 Hopefully, the 
CJEU will have the opportunity to elaborate more on this national security based division of 
competences in relation to the surveillance measures in the near future. The UK Investigatory 
Powers Tribunal (IPT), which is the oversight authority for the surveillance practices of the 
UK public authorities, has already referred a question on this matter to the CJEU.109 It might 
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take some years before the CJEU gives an answer because the IPT did not expedite this 
reference and the negotiations of the UK’s leave from the EU might take precedence.110 
Nevertheless, when it does answer the question, the CJEU will inevitably have an impact on 
the future of the surveillance measures in the context of countering terrorism.  
Another impact of the Opinion is that it comes as a challenge to the scope of the 
transfer and use of personal data schemes for purposes of fight against terrorism in general. 
Existing schemes falling short of the requirements established in this Opinion are 
incompatible with EU fundamental rights. These schemes include the Terrorist Finance 
Tracking Program Agreement with the USA on transfer of financial data111 and agreements 
signed with the US112 and Australia113 on PNR data transfers. Conflicts between these 
agreements and the CJEU’s findings in its Opinion at hand imperils their legality in EU 
law.114 The same arguments may also be made with regards to other data transfer schemes 
such as the Privacy Shield115 and the Umbrella Agreement116 as well as to the EU’s own 
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internal PNR scheme.117 On the same line, any future international agreement on the data 
transfer has to meet with the criteria set out in Opinion 1/15 to be legal in EU law. For this 
reason, the Opinion has been referred to as a ‘significant victory for the fundamental rights to 
privacy and data protection.’118  
Indeed, the Court’s consistent reference to Digital Rights Ireland, Schrems, and Tele2 
shows its determination in affirming the fundamental rights to privacy and data protection in 
the face of claims by states regarding necessity in counter-terrorism measures. However, it is 
worth noting here that a closer look at the Court’s Opinion elicits the question whether it is 
really a win for those fundamental rights. This is because, by contrast with its case-law, it did 
not voice its discontent with the ‘general and indiscriminate retention’119 of personal data, or 
on the mass surveillance of air passengers. In the view of the Court, the transfer of PNR data 
of all passengers regardless of their prior criminal record was justified because the objective 
of utilising PNR data automatically is to assess the risk a passenger possess for public 
security before the passenger concerned is admitted to the country. Therefore, the very nature 
of this objective did not require the link between the person and the risk on the ground of 
terrorism. Seen from another angle, the Court indirectly acknowledged that travelling per se 
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is such a link, intertwining measures of border control and of counter-terrorism.120 This is 
certainly at odds with the Article 29 Working Party’s and the EDPS’s opinions on the PNR 
scheme, where both authorities denounced its feature of indiscriminate transfer, collection, 
and processing of data in bulks.121  
Another point worth to mention is that the CJEU considered for the first time the 
automated decision-making and information retrieval from a voluminous amount of data. 
Although this consideration is welcoming, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that the 
discourse surrounding the pre-established models (i.e. algorithms) upon which automated 
decisions are reached are more complex than the Court touched upon. As an example, the 
Court noted that these models should be specific and reliable, but in many cases, the public 
authorities either have declined to provide information on these models by revoking the 
national security interest or have merely stated that they are reliable without any further detail 
on the matter. Also, the reasonable suspicion that the CJEU mentioned in identifying 
passengers who might participate in terrorist offences or transnational crimes through running 
algorithms against their PNR data might not be the same as the reasonable suspicion arrived 
at through observations, discrete facts, or limited information by law enforcement authorities 
because it consists of a search through vast networked information sources including a proxy 
for flagging the person as a reasonable suspect, which is previous convictions, previous 
arrests, or previous reports on participation in the offences concerned. Equally important is 
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the margin of error that the automated decision-making presents. Having accepted a 
significant level of margin of error, the Court gave emphasis on the need not to have solely 
this mean of decision to adopt measures against individuals. However, the question relating 
to the margin of error should have been dealt in relation to the appropriateness of the 
processing of PNR data in countering terrorism and transnational crime because if the 
automated decision-making measure generates a significant level of error, it may be 
considered as useless to attain its objective.122 Had the Court considered this point, the 
automated processing of PNR data might have been considered inappropriate for the purpose 
that processing pursues and the Agreement would have been considered as a violation of 
privacy and data protection rights, without having to delve into the proportionality of the 
Agreement. 
Be that as it may, whilst the CJEU did not reject the PNR scheme as a whole, it 
provided a check-list of procedural requirements for that scheme to be compatible with EU 
fundamental rights. These requirements can be difficult to fulfil because each of them 
contains layers of discussions on their own. For example, the Court noted that the pre-
established models (i.e. algorithms) must be specific, reliable, and non-discriminatory, but 
how this will be investigated is not an easy task. Therefore, the detail and the complexity that 
come with the procedural requirements might suggest that the Court might not have struck 
down the PNR data scheme altogether, but it sure has made it hard to design a EU 
fundamental rights complaint scheme. 
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